Serbia (Brussels Morning) Following the recent second anniversary of the start of the war in Ukraine, the geopolitical rivalry between West and East has been intensifying, with more and more countries getting caught up in the political fallout. The relatively fast turnover time between Moldova’s application to become an EU candidate state in March 2022 and the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations last December, reflect ongoing efforts to eliminate the risks emanating from a thus far unaligned buffer zone between Europe and Russia. Moldova, however, should tread carefully about mixing its aspirations for EU membership—a legitimate goal in the long term—with the broader geopolitical motives that have emerged in the context of the ongoing conflict, and which do not currently serve Moldova’s best interests. Not only can the current approach, which pushes EU ascension at all costs, threaten many of Moldova’s economic interests, it also has the potential to be counterproductive in terms of democracy building in this complex corner of Europe.
Western efforts to influence politics have been apparent in my own country, Serbia, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, providing important lessons that Moldova must keep in mind as well. Serbia has been an EU candidate state since 2012, originally signaling its intention to join the union three years before that. Nevertheless, the prospect of realizing concrete accession has only drifted further and further away. Over the past two years, U.S. pressure has increased on Belgrade to side with the Western block in their sanctions regime against Russia. At the same time, a pressure campaign has been exerted on the country by declaring that Serbia’s non-alignment with the common EU foreign policy directive is hindering its joining the union.
Serbia’s balancing act between East and West must be understood within the context of pragmatic economic considerations, namely the country’s substantial reliance on Russian gas imports, which have made up an overwhelming majority of its domestic consumption. Although a recent deal with Azerbaijan is expected to diversify Serbia’s energy reliance, economic incentives will remain significant. Serbian interests appeared to be secondary to EU priorities when the European bloc imposed its first embargo on the delivery of Russian petroleum products via Europe, cutting supply to Serbia via the Adriatic Sea and completely upsetting the country’s energy security.
An important parallel between the Serbian case and that of Moldova is that the latter also has a significant energy relationship with Russia. Although Moldova has virtually eradicated its direct reliance on Russian imports over the past year, Russian gas continues to power the Kuchurgan power plant in the autonomous Moldovan region of Transnistria. Kuchurgan generates around 74% of the energy supply of Moldovan territories on the right bank of the Dniester River. While increasing competition in Moldova’s energy market is an ongoing effort, it will likely take years before the share of supply from the Kuchurgan plant as well as imports from Ukraine can be eradicated. Accession to the EU is in no case immediate as a significant preparatory stage precedes it in both the political, economic, and fiscal systems that prepare a country to be in sync with already formidable EU-level institutions and the globally prominent Common Market. Interconnectivity with the European energy networks is one element of this.
As Serbia’s case demonstrated, however, a relatively protracted negotiation and reform process can give way to disillusionment. Since 2022, a majority of Serbs have been against joining the EU. The potential risk to social cohesion that such issues can have on countries whose populations hold such diverging political views can and should not be understated. This should also be concerning to all those in Moldova who have been encouraged by President Maia Sandu’s fervently pro-EU campaign. Moldova’s recent moves against freedom of expression in the media and the free competition of parties in elections stand in stark contrast to the liberal democratic promises of accession to the EU. In December 2022, Moldova’s Audiovisual Council suspended the operational license of six TV channels while an additional six channels were shut down by the same body in October 2023. Although reasons were given for these moves that were ostensibly not-anti democratic, such government activities must be judged by an objective standard of what is acceptable in a Western democracy.
Freedom House highlighted that several protests took place in Moldova throughout 2023, in opposition to a so-called “state of emergency” regime. On 3rd November, Moldova’s Commission for Exceptional Situations—associated with the aforementioned state of emergency, which has been prolonged multiple times since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine—took the radical step of banning the Chance Party’s candidates from participating in elections, despite being the largest opposition grouping by membership. Moldovans should not expect their own country’s EU candidate status, or indeed membership, to be helpful in any way in resolving internal political issues. Indeed, Serbia’s pursuit of EU membership only exacerbated internal political divisions, leading to heightened tensions among political factions competing for power and influence.
Instead of the catch-all promises of EU membership, Moldovans should be offered a gradual and realistic partnership with the EU that is mindful of the country’s economic interests and geopolitical position. The same approach would arguably benefit Serbians too. As Serbia could carve out a foreign policy niche as a mediator between member states of the EU and countries of the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, so could Moldova retain a level of neutrality when it comes to East-West affairs, particularly in instances when EU Member States do not see eye to eye with the EU on foreign policy issues. In the case of Serbia, this complements the strategy of treading carefully about the so far unresolved disagreements about Kosovo, a matter of utmost national importance and which has been followed closely by great powers in both the East and the West.f Normalizing such a pragmatic approach in Serbia’s relationship with the EU could pave the way to applying similar standards in Moldova.
Subordinating the arguably long-term prospect of accession to the EU to the immediate geopolitical considerations emanating from the war in neighboring Ukraine would not only expose Moldova to the aforementioned risks but also taint the entire process as a simply utilitarian move. To uphold this delicate process’s integrity, the two must be fully separated.
